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ABSTRACT 
 
Even though several years have passed since the large corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, 
corporate governance continues to remain an area of concern and focus in the global economy, 
and especially in the emerging markets. Corporate governance refers to the quality, transparency, 
and dependability of the relationships between the shareholders, board of directors, management, 
and employees that define the authority and responsibility of each in delivering sustainable value 
to all the stakeholders. The importance of the issue has been growing at an international level and 
the quality of corporate governance practices, which is deemed to be as important as financial 
performance in investment decisions, has become a subject of more serious consideration. In 
recent years the issue of corporate governance and their impacts on corporate performance have 
continued to gain widespread prominence in the capital market economy. Higher compliance with 
the corporate governance standards means more accountable and transparent companies for 
investors.  In this framework, firstly, the transparency levels of financial information disclosures 
in corporate governance reports and annual reports are calculated by establishing a transparency 
checklist for the year 2010. MANOVA analysis is conducted to examine the relationship between 
the calculated transparency levels and financial ratios. The results reveal that transparency level 
has statistical differences among the group means of return on asset, total debt / total assets, long-
term debt / total assets and corporate governance index variables.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 significant feature of the corporate environment during the last two decades has been increasing 
conformity internationally in the models and mechanisms relied on for corporate governance. 
(Collier, Zaman, 2000) Corporate governance is the system by which organizations are governed and 
controlled. It is concerned with the ways in which corporations are governed generally and in particular with the 
relationship between the management of an organization and its shareholders. In recent years the issue of corporate 
governance and their impacts on corporate performance have continued to gain widespread prominence in the 
capital market economy. The expectations of stakeholders with respect to the corporate governance process have 
never been higher, and scrutiny by regulators and investors never more stringent. Attention has turned to not only 
the effectiveness of corporate governance but also to transparency and disclosure which is very important for 
shareholders.  
 
 
A 
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The impetus for improved transparency and disclosure practices is linked to the broader corporate 
governance debate both in Europe and on a global basis. The visible corporate governance failures in the US, 
including Enron, WorldCom and Tyco have found, at least to some extent, European counterparts in the form of 
Ahold, Cable & Wireless, and Vivendi Universal. While the impact of these European examples lack the magnitude 
of those in the US, they nonetheless demonstrate that corporate governance, transparency and control issues are 
vulnerabilities that are not limited to the US or to emerging market. (Standard & Poor’s, 2003)  
 
Corporate governance refers to the quality, transparency, and dependability of the relationships between the 
shareholders, board of directors, management, and employees that define the authority and responsibility of each in 
delivering sustainable value to all the stakeholders. Transparency is clearly linked to the debate about governance 
reform, as it embodies one of the core principles corporate governance. It is presented as an overarching cornerstone 
of the OECD corporate governance guidelines: “Investor confidence and market efficiency depend on the disclosure 
of accurate timely information about corporate performance. To be of value in the global capital markets, disclosed 
information should be clear, consistent and comparable” (OECD,1998) Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) are 
fundamental components of corporate governance. Greater transparency and disclosure keep corporate stakeholders 
beter informed about the way a company is being managed and governed. (Healy & Palepu, 2001.) 
  
Many countries have since introduced voluntary codes endorsing the OECD principles. The universal 
principles of corporate governance are fairness, accountability, transparency and responsibility. The Principles 
consist of four main sections namely shareholders, disclosure and transparency, stakeholders and board of directors 
(CMB, 2003); 
 
The second section of OECD Corporate Governance Principles discusses the Principles regarding 
disclosure and transparency issues. Within this scope, Principles for establishment of information policies in 
companies with respect to shareholders and the adherence of companies to these policies are discussed.  The 
conditions of today’s global financial economy and conditions faced in our country have been taken into 
consideration while setting single standards for the procedures for providing information via periodic financial 
statements and reports and detailing such standards through consideration of functionality. (CMB, 2003); 
 
In Turkey, the corporate governance framework rests primarily upon a “public enforcement” model, with 
the Capital Markets Board (CMB) playing a leading role in setting corporate governance standards for publicly held 
companies, enforcing the applicable standards and fostering market integrity.  The ambitious, state-of-the-art and 
comprehensive CMB principles, adopted in 2003, are the principal source of non-binding corporate governance 
standards for publicly held companies.  They were revised in 2005 to take into account revisions made to the OECD 
Principles in 2004.  Listed companies must publish an annual Corporate Governance Compliance statement, 
disclosing which CMB principles have not been adopted and the reasons for not doing so. (CMB, 2003); 
 
The corporate environment in Turkey, however, is better positioned than many European countries to 
tackle corporate governance challenges ahead, because:  (OECD, 2006,) 
 
 the authorities have already adopted, or are introducing, high quality corporate governance standards 
(including audit standards); 
 transparency has improved significantly, particularly in the are of financial reporting (listed companies are 
urged to adopt accounting standards which are almost identical to IFRS); 
 a positive trend toward widespread implementation of a number of key corporate governance standards can 
be observed; and 
 the authorities are now focusing their attention on monitoring implementation, identifying the remaining 
gaps and risk areas, focusing their resources on these risk areas and implementing institutional reforms as 
needed to strengthen supervisory, enforcement and remedial processes.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a detailed survey of past studies. Section 
III explains the data (variables employed) and methodology while the results are presented in Section IV. Finally, 
Section V gives the conclusion. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several studies have been and is still being realized in the area of corporate governance. Healy& Palepu 
(2001) suggest that better disclosure has a positive impact on the efficient functioning of capital markets. Brown and 
Caylor (2006a, 2006b) construct a governance score using ISS governance factors and find that firms with lower 
governance scores have higher return on equity, higher profit margins, and higher firm valuations. Using principal 
components analysis, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) construct 14 governance factors and find that these are 
related to future operating performance and stock returns. 
 
Klapper and Love’s (2002) empirical study provides evidence that firm-level corporate governance quality 
matter more in countries with weak legal environments in attracting investors. This finding suggests that well-
governed firms can compensate for weak legal/institutional environment and law enforcement at the national level 
by establishing good governance practices such as greater firm disclosure and stronger minority shareholder rights at 
the company level. 
 
Aras and Crowther (2008a, b, c) stated that the aim of the corporate governance principles is to ‘‘increase 
both shareholder value and the satisfaction of other stakeholders’’. Achievement of this aim is largely linked with 
the development of capital markets in which the corporate governance principles – transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and fairness – are understood by both investors and shareholders. 
 
Full disclosure and transparency of financial information are vital components of the Corporate 
Governance  Framework (OECD, 1999) and are regarded as important indicators of Corporate Governance quality.
 
 
Beeks and Brown (2005) find that firms with higher Corporate Governace quality make more informative 
disclosures. Sadka (2004) provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the public sharing of financial and analyst 
reports have enhanced factor productivity and economic growth in 30 countries. Berglof and Pajuste (2005) report 
that more information is publicly available in larger firms, firms with lower leverage, higher financial performance, 
higher market-to-book ratios and more concentrated ownership. several studies have done which investigates the 
relationship between disclosure and leverage. For e.g.,while Dellas and Hess (2005) found  significant relationship 
between disclosure and leverage, Ho and Wong (2001) found no relationship between disclosure and leverage. 
 
Sandeep et al. (2002)  use a new dataset to analyze Transparency & Disclosure scores (T&D score) in 19 
emerging markets for 354 firms representing 70% of S&P/IFCI Index market capitalization over the 3 years ending 
in 2000. They analyze differences across countries, economic sectors and trend over the 3 years. They find that the 
Asian emerging markets and South Africa have significantly higher transparency and disclosure compared to the 
Latin American, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern emerging markets. The gap between the Asian emerging 
markets and South Africa over other emerging markets has increased over the last 3 years. They do not find any 
significant differences in T&D scores among economic sectors. Changes in the T&D scores over the last 3 years, 
however, differ by economic sectors for the 6 markets with the largest investable market capitalization and/or 
number of observations, viz. Brazil, Poland, South Africa, India, Thailand, and Korea. They then study the 
relationships between T&D scores and cross-holdings for the 6 emerging markets. For the 6 markets except Korea, 
correlation between cross-holdings and T&D scores is negative. For the 6 markets except South Africa, correlation 
between price-to-book ratios and T&D scores is positive. 
 
Aksu and Kösedağ (2006) use 98 T&D attributes they used in and their classification of the attributes into 
three categories: ownership structure and investor relations, financial transparency and information disclosure, and 
board and management structures and processes. They evaluate the T&D practices of the 52 largest and most liquid 
firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), based on their English and local language annual reports and websites. 
They also consider a simple model that sequentially links agency problems to CG/T&D mechanisms in place, which 
in turn impact firm-level and economy-wide financial performance. Concentrating on the causal side of the model –
the determinants of T&D scores– they provide out-of-sample evidence that firm size, financial performance and 
market-to-book equity best explain the variation in T&D scores in the ISE.  
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III. DATA &RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This study investigates the relationship between the transparency level and the financial performance 
indicators of firms operating in real sector. Our sample only consists of the 57 largest manufacturing companies 
which are listed in ISE 100 indice during the year 2010. The distribution and percentage of 57 companies by sectors 
are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 1: Number of companies by sectors 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of companies by sectors 
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The study analyzes disclosure practices of these firms from an investor perspective. It therefore focuses on 
sources of information that are most readily accessible by local and international investors – typically the latest 
available English language and local language company annual reports and the English and Turkish web sites. In 
this framework, the transparency levels of financial information disclosures in corporate governance reports and 
annual reports are calculated by establishing a transparency checklist. In the transparency checklist, 27 criteria 
derived from only the disclosure and transparency section of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles. (See 
Appendix 1) The financial statements are gathered from ISE web site and the governance compliance and annual 
reports are taken from web sites of firms investigated.14 financial ratios (calculated as financial performance 
indicators) and 1 dummy variable (Corporate Governance Index), totally 15 independent variables are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1:  Financial Performance Indicators Used in the Study 
Financial Ratios Calculation Used in Analysis as 
Current Ratio Curret Assets / Current Liabilities X1 
Acid-test Ratio Curret Assets- Inventories / Current Liabilities X2 
Cash Ratio Cash & Bank / Current Liabilities X3 
Net Profit Margin Net Profit / Sales X4 
Gross Profit Margin Gross Profit / Sales X5 
Operating Margin EBIT / Sales X6 
Return on Equity Net Profit / Equity X7 
Return on Asset Net Profit / Total Assets X8 
Debt Ratio Total Debt / Total Assets X9 
Short-term Debt Ratio Short-term Debt / Total Assets X10 
Long-term Debt Ratio Long-term Debt / Total Assets X11 
Fixed-Asset Turnover Ratio Sales / Fixed Assets X12 
Ability to Pay Interest Cash From Operating Activities / Interest Expense X13 
Earning Per Share Net Income / Number of Common Stock X14 
Corporate Governance Index1 If the firm is in CGI, the value is 1, otherwise 0 X15 
 
 
When the relevant information in the annual report and corporate governance compliance report is found, 
“1” is assigned to the company. Otherwise, the company gets “0” point. The points for each company are summed 
up and the transparency score is calculated by dividing this sum to 27. After calculating this transparency level score 
of 57 companies, these companies are divided into 3 categories as shown in Table 2 and MANOVA Analysis is 
applied to investigate if there is a significant difference between means of at least one financial ratio of at least two 
groups of transparency categories. 
 
 
Table 2: Category Diversification of Firms 
Category Name of the categories Transparency Level Number of Companies 
1 Most Transparent 85%-100% 23 
2 Transparent 84%-70% 27 
3 Least Transparent 69%-below 7 
 
 
MANOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Variance) is employed by SPSS 17 in order to assess group 
differences across the financial ratios simultaneously. The MANOVA (multivariate analysis of variance) is an 
extension of analysis of variance to accommodate more than one dependent variable. It is a dependence technique 
that measures the differences for two or more metric dependent variables based on a set of categorical (nonmetric) 
                                                 
1The board meeting of ISE on 23 February 2005 it was decided that a corporate governance index be established for listed 
companies. ISE Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) is the index in which companies applying Corporate Governance 
Principles are included. ISE Corporate Governance Index aims to measure the price and return performances of ISE-listed 
companies. In Turkey, there are 30 companies listed in Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) as of June, 30, 2011. 
(www.ise.gov.tr) 
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variables acting as independent variables. Manova analysis is applied in four steps: (1) multivariate tests: to test the 
basic assumption of Manova, (2) Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances: to test for equality of error variances 
across dependent variables, (3) Test of Between-Subjects Effect: to investigate if the independent variable differ on 
all of the dependent measures, (4) Post hoc tests: to test the significance of differences in levels of an independent 
factor with respect to a dependent variables. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Table 3:  Multivariate Tests 
    
Hypothesis Error 
 
Partial Eta 
Effect 
 
Value F df df Sig. Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace 0,9659 82,9427 14 41 0,000 0,9659 
  Wilks' Lambda 0,0341 82,9427 14 41 0,000 0,9659 
  Hotelling's Trace 28,3219 82,9427 14 41 0,000 0,9659 
  Roy's Largest Root 28,3219 82,9427 14 41 0,000 0,9659 
Transparency  Pillai's Trace 0,7052 1,6338 28 84 0,0451 0,3526 
 Category Wilks' Lambda 0,3977 1,7156 28 82 0,0317 0,3694 
  Hotelling's Trace 1,2562 1,7946 28 80 0,0226 0,3858 
  Roy's Largest Root 0,9968 2,9905 14 42 0,0030 0,4992 
 
 
Table 3 contains the four most commonly used multivariate tests (Pillai’s Trace, Wilk’s Lambda, 
Hotelling’s Trace and Roy’s Largest Root) and the basic hypothesis of Manova (the population means on the 
multiple dependent variables are equal across groups) is tested by the multivariate tests. All of the statistical criteria 
provide similar conclusions. Since the significance level of all tests are smaller than 5 %, each of the four measures 
indicate that there is a significant difference between the means of at least one dependent variable (financial ratio) of 
at least two groups of independent variable (transparency levels of firms). 
 
Table 4:  Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
  F df1 df2 Sig. 
X1 ,253 2 54 ,777 
X2 ,816 2 54 ,448 
X3 3,074 2 54 ,054 
X4 2,211 2 54 ,119 
X5 1,610 2 54 ,209 
X6 3,668 2 54 ,032 
X7 1,414 2 54 ,252 
X8 11,406 2 54 ,000 
X9 ,161 2 54 ,852 
X10 2,450 2 54 ,096 
X11 4,087 2 54 ,022 
X12 1,671 2 54 ,198 
X13 ,762 2 54 ,472 
X14 1,779 2 54 ,179 
X15 930,526 2 54 ,000 
 
 
Table 4 displays the results of Levene’s test for equality of error variances across financial ratios. As it is 
seen in the table, it can be concluded that equal variances is assumed for variables with significance level > 0,05. 
 
After significant results are obtained by multivariate tests, for further investigation the test of between-
subjects effect is performed in relation to each of the dependent variables ( financial ratios). The Test of Between-
Subjects Effects investigates if there is a significant difference between the means of at least one financial ratio of at 
least two groups of the transparency levels. In Table 5, each of the dependent variables is listed with their associated 
univariate F, df and Sig. values. The results confirm that the type of transparency levels reveal the differences across 
the financial ratios namely X8,X11, X15 for 5 % significance level and X9 for 10 % significance level. 
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Table 5:  Test of Between-Subjects Effect Table 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
Transparency  X1 2,9581 2 1,4791 0,4044 0,6694 0,0148 
 Category X2 4,4336 2 2,2168 0,6010 0,5519 0,0218 
  X3 1,8179 2 0,9089 0,7750 0,4658 0,0279 
  X4 0,3139 2 0,1569 1,2985 0,2813 0,0459 
  X5 0,0146 2 0,0073 0,1454 0,8650 0,0054 
  X6 0,1222 2 0,0611 1,9957 0,1458 0,0688 
  X7 0,1478 2 0,0739 2,2995 0,1101 0,0785 
  X8 0,0757 2 0,0379 3,6182 0,0335 0,1182 
  X9 0,2608 2 0,1304 2,8005 0,0696 0,0940 
  X10 0,0538 2 0,0269 0,8672 0,4259 0,0311 
  X11 0,1865 2 0,0933 5,7181 0,0056 0,1748 
  X12 1150,0449 2 575,0224 0,4537 0,6377 0,0165 
  X13 48,1736 2 24,0868 0,1090 0,8969 0,0040 
  X14 13,7041 2 6,8521 1,8839 0,1619 0,0652 
  X15 2,5934 2 1,2967 12,3887 0,0000 0,3145 
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Table 6:  Post hoc tests for significant dependent variables 
Dependent Variable   (I) code (J) code Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
   
      
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
X8 Tukey HSD 1 2 -0,0421 0,0218 0,1700 -0,0963 0,0121 
   
3 -0,1163 0,0794 0,4713 -0,3721 0,1396 
  
2 1 0,0421 0,0218 0,1700 -0,0121 0,0963 
   
3 -0,0741 0,0806 0,7727 -0,3290 0,1807 
  
3 1 0,1163 0,0794 0,4713 -0,1396 0,3721 
 
 
 
2 0,0741 0,0806 0,7727 -0,1807 0,3290 
 
Tamhane 1 2 -0,0421 0,0290 0,3226 -0,1121 0,0278 
   
3 -0,1163 0,0442 0,0292 -0,2227 -0,0098 
  
2 1 0,0421 0,0290 0,3226 -0,0278 0,1121 
   
3 -0,0741 0,0434 0,2112 -0,1787 0,0304 
  
3 1 0,1163 0,0442 0,0292 0,0098 0,2227 
 
 
 
2 0,0741 0,0434 0,2112 -0,0304 0,1787 
X9 Tukey HSD 1 2 0,1390 0,0612 0,0687 -0,0085 0,2866 
   
3 0,1333 0,0931 0,3326 -0,0912 0,3577 
  
2 1 -0,1390 0,0612 0,0687 -0,2866 0,0085 
   
3 -0,0058 0,0915 0,9978 -0,2263 0,2148 
  
3 1 -0,1333 0,0931 0,3326 -0,3577 0,0912 
 
 
 
2 0,0058 0,0915 0,9978 -0,2148 0,2263 
 
Tamhane 1 2 0,1390 0,0611 0,0802 -0,0122 0,2903 
   
3 0,1333 0,0933 0,4571 -0,1345 0,4010 
  
2 1 -0,1390 0,0611 0,0802 -0,2903 0,0122 
   
3 -0,0058 0,0921 0,9999 -0,2725 0,2609 
  
3 1 -0,1333 0,0933 0,4571 -0,4010 0,1345 
 
 
 
2 0,0058 0,0921 0,9999 -0,2609 0,2725 
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Table 6:  Post hoc tests (Continued) 
Dependent Variable   (I) code (J) code Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
   
      
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
X11 Tukey HSD 1 2 0,1205 0,0362 0,0045 0,0332 0,2078 
   
3 0,0335 0,0551 0,8170 -0,0994 0,1663 
  
2 1 -0,1205 0,0362 0,0045 -0,2078 -0,0332 
   
3 -0,0871 0,0542 0,2513 -0,2176 0,0435 
  
3 1 -0,0335 0,0551 0,8170 -0,1663 0,0994 
 
 
 
2 0,0871 0,0542 0,2513 -0,0435 0,2176 
 
Tamhane 1 2 0,1205 0,0374 0,0088 0,0263 0,2147 
   
3 0,0335 0,0643 0,9420 -0,1470 0,2139 
  
2 1 -0,1205 0,0374 0,0088 -0,2147 -0,0263 
   
3 -0,0871 0,0569 0,4269 -0,2639 0,0898 
  
3 1 -0,0335 0,0643 0,9420 -0,2139 0,1470 
 
 
 
2 0,0871 0,0569 0,4269 -0,0898 0,2639 
X15 Tukey HSD 1 2 0,4348 0,0918 0,0000 0,2135 0,6560 
   
3 0,4348 0,1397 0,0082 0,0982 0,7714 
  
2 1 -0,4348 0,0918 0,0000 -0,6560 -0,2135 
   
3 0,0000 0,1372 1,0000 -0,3307 0,3307 
  
3 1 -0,4348 0,1397 0,0082 -0,7714 -0,0982 
 
 
 
2 0,0000 0,1372 1,0000 -0,3307 0,3307 
 
Tamhane 1 2 0,4348 0,1057 0,0014 0,1617 0,7078 
   
3 0,4348 0,1057 0,0014 0,1617 0,7078 
  
2 1 -0,4348 0,1057 0,0014 -0,7078 -0,1617 
   
3 0,0000 0,0000 . 0,0000 0,0000 
  
3 1 -0,4348 0,1057 0,0014 -0,7078 -0,1617 
 
 
 
2 0,0000 0,0000 . 0,0000 0,0000 
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For each dependent variable, post hoc test displays that if there is a significant difference between the 
group means of independent variable. This helps to specify the exact nature of the overall effect determined by the 
multivariate test. Post hoc methods are widely used because of the ease in which multiple comparisons are made. 
The most common post hoc procedures are Tukey’s honestly significant difference test, applied when equality of 
error variances is assumed, and Tamhane’s T2 test applied in case of inequality of error variances.  
 
In Table 6 the transparency level does differ in relation to X8, X9, X11 and X15 variables. As it is seen in 
Levene Test Table, while the error variances of X9 are equal, X8, X11 and X15’s are not. Therefore, for variable X9 
Tukey Test, for variables X8, X11 and X15 Tamhane test are considered. For X8 there is a significant difference 
between first and third category for 5% significance level, for X9 there is a significant difference between first and 
second category for 10 % significance level, for X11 there is a significant difference between first and second 
category for 5 % significance level, for X15 there is a significant difference between first and second, first and third 
categories for 1% significance level. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Within the past decade, the concept of corporate governance has played an ever increasingly significant 
role in enhancing the competitive power of global financial markets. An important branch in this literature brings 
together comparisons of financial and legal systems, a branch for which increasingly the term “corporate 
governance” is used. One of the most important underlying factors behind the cause of both the recent financial 
crises and recent company scandals that broke out across the world can be attributed to the inadequacy of sound 
Corporate Governance Principles by both the public and private sectors.  As a result, the concept of corporate 
governance has gained increased attention from all around the world. Transparency and disclosure are fundamental 
components of corporate governance. Transparency defined as, sharing information and acting in an open manner 
and transparency allows stakeholders to gather information that may be critical to uncovering abuses and defending 
their interests Transparent systems have clear procedures for public decision-making and open channels of 
communication between stakeholders and officials, and make a wide range of information. Greater transparency and 
disclosure keep corporate stakeholders better informed about the way a company being managed and governed.  
 
The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between the transparency level and the financial 
performance indicators of 57 firms operating in real sector in ISE-100 index during the year 2010. Firstly, the 
transparency levels of financial information disclosures in corporate governance reports and annual reports are 
calculated by establishing a transparency checklist for the year 2010. After calculating this transparency level score 
of 57 companies, these companies are divided into 3 categories. MANOVA analysis is applied to test the 
relationship between the transparency level and the financial performance indicators. The results reveal that 
transparency level has statistically significant effect between the group means of three variables. These variables are 
namely return on asset, total debt / total assets, long-term debt / total assets and corporate governance index.  
 
 
 For Return on asset variable ( X8);   there is a significant difference between first and second category for  5 
% significance level. The mean of the first group is greater than the second one.  
 For Total debt / Total Asset ratio variable ( X9);   there is a significant difference between first and second 
category for 10 % significance level. The mean of the first group is greater than the second one. 
 For long-term debt / total assets ratio variable (X11);   there is a significant difference between first and 
second category for 5 % significance level. The mean of the first group is greater than the second one. 
 For corporate governance index variable (X15), there is a significant difference between first and second, 
first and third categories for 1% significance level. This means that if the company is listed in ISE 
corporate governance index, it is likely to be more transparent. 
 
For further studies coefficients can be assigned to criteria in transparency checklist in relation to 
importance of the subject. In this study, only the financial information disclosure transparency is investigated. It can 
be also generalized for all corporate governance issues. And to gain more financial information disclosure for 
Turkish market, all companies listed in ISE can be added to population of the study.   
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APPENDIX 1:  Financial Information Transparency Check-List 
1. Annual reports including periodical financial statements and the audit report are available in company’s web site.  
2. Corporate governance compliance reports are available in company’s web site. 
3. Periodical financial statements and footnotes  prepared in accordance with the international  accounting standards and 
applied accounting policies are included in the footnotes of the financial statements. 
4. The footnotes of the periodical financial statements include all off-balance sheet transactions including contingent 
claims,  all liabilities and operational results that would affect future financial status, liquidity of the company, 
investment expenditures, investment sources, all factors that would affect the future relations of the company with other 
natural persons and legal entities which are not within the scope ofconsolidation.   
5. Periodical financial statements  comprise all forms of incentives that is designed to grant shares to employees, i.e. 
employee stock ownership plans based on shares and/or other capital market instruments.  
6. The annual report was signed by the board chairman, chief executive officer/general director and department manager 
responsible for the preparation of periodical financial statements and reports or by the company official who was 
appointed to fulfil such responsibility. 
7. Financial information on a quarterly basis was explained. 
8. An audit committee in charge of  supervision of the financial and operational activities of the   committee is established. 
The below listed issues are incorporated in the company’s annual report;  
9. Scope of activities of the company,  
10. Information about the sector in which the company operates and the company’s status within this  sector,  
11. Board of directors’ evaluation and analysis of financial status and operation results; level of     achievement of the 
planned operations; the company’s position with respect to the defined strategic objectives,  
12. Board of directors’ statement about the status of  internal control system,  
13. Audit firm’s opinion about the internal control system,  
14. Detailed explanation about the foreseeable risk factors regarding future operations,  
15. Analysis of significant transactions carried out during the preceding year with the group companies and  other related 
persons and institutions,  
16. Changes in the organization, capital, ownership and management structure of the company,  
17. Ownership structure table showing the controlling shareholder(s), as released from any indirect and cross ownership 
relation 
18. Dividend policy; the reason/s for not distributing dividends, if applicable,  
19. Future forecasts for sales, company’s level  of efficiency, company’s market share, income yielding capacity of the 
company, company profitability and the company’s  debt/equity ratios and similar issues,  
20. Statistical data and graphics about  company and industry  incorporated in the annual report.  
21. The audit firm and auditors employed by such audit firm must be independent. (Independence principle indicates that 
the independent audit activities are conducted without being influenced by any relationship, benefit or other factors that 
may impede the auditor’s professional discretion and impartiality. ) 
22. Name of the auditing firm is explained. 
23. How much company pays in audit fees to the auditor is explained. 
24. Audit firms are subject to regular rotation.  (The board of directors  appoint an audit firm for continuous and/or 
exclusive audits for a maximum period of 5 years. Capital Markets Board of Turkey.) 
25. Audit and consultancy services are clearly separated.  
26. All significant developments and their possible implications on the financial status and operational results of  the 
company are disclosed immediately to the public. (e.g. uncertainty about the repayment of significant amounts of credit, 
a lawsuit brought against or filed by the company at significant amounts, any significant change in the management and 
capital structure of the parent company, any change in the company’s major operations subsidiaries/affiliated companies 
and companies under joint management,  any changes in or resignation of the company’s audit firm or termination of 
independent audit agreement,  
27. All Turkish Financial disclosure information is avaliable in English.  
 
 
